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When Discretion to Record Becomes
Assertive: Body Camera Footage as
Hearsay
ABSTRACT

As police body camera footage pervades courtrooms across the
country as evidence in criminal trials, courts must reevaluate whether,
and under which evidentiary frameworks, they will admit the footage
to prove that what the footage depicts is true. This Note analyzes the
frameworks under which courts have historically admitted filmic
evidence: namely, through authentication and as demonstrative
evidence. It concludes that body camera footage is distinct from
evidence traditionally admitted through those frameworks because
body camera footage is akin to an officer's assertive statement-the
officer has discretion to activate and aim the body camera. Courts
should therefore exclude the footage as hearsay when it is offered to
prove the truth of the matter depicted in the video. This Note proposes
two practicalframeworks under which courts could nevertheless admit
the footage should they classify it as hearsay: the present sense
impression exception to hearsay, or as corroborativeevidence that is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Both frameworks make the
police officer who recorded the footage available for cross-examination.
Once the officer is on the stand, a defense attorney may cross-examine
that officer to mitigate the reliability concerns that body camera footage
presents.
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In July 2017, the Baltimore Sun reported that a public
defender had come across an unusual piece of body camera footage.'
The video, like all body camera videos recorded by Baltimore City
police officers, begins with thirty seconds of silent footage, which is the
camera's visual data from the thirty seconds prior to activation. 2 This
particular video depicts-from Officer A's point of view-Officer A
holding a clear plastic bag of a white substance in an alley. Officer A
places the bag inside a can, placing the can into a trash pile in the
alley. Officer B and Officer C stand nearby, watching. The three
officers walk out of the alley. Officer A's hand comes into view as he
activates his body camera, and precisely at the thirty-second mark,
the sound comes on. Officer A says, "Let me go check here, hold on,"

1.
See Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Body Camera Footage Shows Officer Planting
Drugs,
Public
Defender
Says,
BALT.
SUN
(July
19,
2017,
2:30
PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crimelbs-md-ci-body-camera-footage-20170719story.html [https://perma.cc/KJ7X-SRB4]. The footage is available online embedded in the
Baltimore Sun's article concerning the incident, along with supplemental footage released by the
Baltimore police. See id.
2.
Id. Because body camera footage takes up an enormous amount of data and battery
life, the cameras do not begin to save the footage captured until an officer activates the camera.
GREG HURLEY, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BODY-WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS 3 (2016),

http://www.courtstoday.com/pdf/269.pdf [https://perma.cc/N62A-5B4A]. When an officer presses
the button to activate, the camera saves the prior thirty seconds of video with no sound and
begins recording and saving both video and sound at the moment of activation. Fenton & Rector,
supra note 1.
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reentering the same alley, as a voice in the background asks, "Was
that thirty?" Officer A soon "finds" the same bag of white substance
hidden in the can. After the public defender brought the video to the
prosecutor's attention, the state dropped the heroin possession charges
against the defendant. 3 The Baltimore Police Commissioner issued a
statement suggesting that the police officers were simply "re-creating"
the discovery of evidence that led to a legitimate arrest rather than
planting evidence. 4
What if the officer had actually waited thirty seconds before
activating his camera, choosing to record his "discovery" after the
device already discarded his prior actions forever? Even accepting the
Police Commissioner's explanation that the officers "re-created" the
evidentiary find, the Baltimore footage highlights the salience of
presenting body camera evidence in context.5 Defendants surely have
an interest in cross-examining the police officer if they observed the
police officer "re-creating" evidence, which the state otherwise
presents to a jury as objective, contemporaneous truth of an encounter
during trial. The current evidentiary regime does not contemplate
problems like video framing6 or the officer's discretion to activate a
camera, which have the potential to greatly influence the video's
reliability. While proponents laud police body cameras for their
potential to capture "objective" evidence of police misconduct,7 state
and federal rules of evidence fail to account for their shortcomings.
The lack of context with which courts admit body camera footage
undercuts the footage as an objective source of proof in criminal
prosecutions.8 If a prosecutor chooses not to call the police officer who

Fenton & Rector, supra note 1. The state's attorney dropped the charges in over forty
3.
criminal cases involving the testimony of the officers depicted in this video. Kevin Rector,
Analysts: Whether Planting Evidence or 'Re-Creating'a Find, Baltimore Body Camera Footage
Shows Police Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Aug. 7, 2017, 6:20 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
[https://perma.cc/
news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-body-camera-react-folo-20170807-story.html
729B-N6RZ].
Rector, supra note 3.
4.
See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2008 (2017).
5.
In this Note, "video framing" refers to the limited field of vision captured by the
6.
camera as well as the perspective from which it is presented. See Jessica Silbey, CrossExamining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 17, 38 (2008) ("Consider first
the film's frame: what is visible in the film and what is not, due to its beginning, ending, and
spatial attributes-its borders, its point of view and its mechanical capacity.").
See ACLU FOUND. OF MASS. & UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF LAW, NO TAPE, NO
7.
TESTIMONY: How COURTS CAN ENSURE THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF BODY CAMERAS 9 (2016)

[hereinafter No TAPE, NO TESTIMONY] ("But police departments are not the only stakeholders
that should have an interest in encouraging the use of body cameras to create objective records of
police-civilian encounters.").
See Roth, supranote 5, at 2007-08.
8.
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recorded the footage to testify, 9 the defense is at a loss for a witness to
cross-examine about the narrative which the footage presents. Or if
another officer testifies instead, the defense has a substantially less
effective cross-examination.1 0 With the officer who recorded the body
camera footage (the "recording officer") on the stand, the defense can
question the officer's record of conduct, question what happened before
and after the recording, and raise doubt about events potentially
occurring off camera or beyond its range.
With video recordings-such as body camera footageincreasingly offered against defendants as proof in court in lieu of live
witness testimony,"
the limitations of what constitutes
a
"statement"12 and to whom it is attributed deserve serious
consideration.
Unlike prior forms of proof such as photographs,
surveillance videos, and data output from machines analyzing forensic
evidence that are historically "not hearsay," 13 body cameras afford
their operators a large amount of discretion to record certain portions
of interactions
from
a
subjective
viewpoint-the
recording
4
officer's -during crucial points in an officer-suspect interaction.
Courts have yet to address the argument that body camera
footage, in and of itself, is hearsay.1 5 While some have argued for
hearsay recognition training so officers avoid recording verbal
statements on the footage, such proposals fail to address the

9.
For example, a prosecutor may not call the officer when the charge is relatively
minor, to save time and resources, or because the officer is otherwise unavailable. The prosecutor
may not think the officer would be a credible witness for a host of potential reasons, like past
misconduct. Some police departments do not outfit all of their officers with body cameras, which
makes it more likely that an officer would not be outfitted with a body camera but may
nevertheless be a valuable prosecution witness. See Police Body Camera Policies: Recording
Circumstances, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
police-body-camera-policies-recording-circumstances
[https://perma.cc/MC3Z-X6PZ]
(listing
departmental policies dictating which officers wear body cameras).
10.
See infra Part II.C.
11.
See Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence,
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 500 (2004) ("One anxiety is the growing trend toward replacing
the traditional testimony of live witnesses in court with communications via video and film
technology.").
12.
See FED. R. EVID. 801-02 (defining "statement" and rendering a statement offered for
"the truth of the matter asserted" inadmissible hearsay).
13.
See infra Part I.A.
14.
HURLEY, supra note 2, at 3 ("A head-mounted unit will capture the areas where the
officer is looking, while a body-mounted unit will only capture video in front of the officer's
body.").
15.
As of Feb. 17, 2018, a search on both Westlaw and LexisAdvance with the terms
("body camera" Is hearsay) returns only opinions ruling on the admissibility of statements
recorded on the body camera footage, not the footage itself.
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possibility that the video itself may be categorized as hearsay.1 6
Federal hearsay jurisprudence recognizes assertive intent as the
defining feature of a statement,1 7 and this Note argues that body
camera videos comport to this assertion-based framework. The videos
are essentially assertions by the recording officer to the effect of, "This
recording reflects all relevant portions of my interaction with a
suspect, it is a true version of how events transpired, and what I
recorded is significant in the criminal investigation." At least one
commentator has suggested that body camera footage may be hearsay,
concluding that it would likely be admissible under the public records
exception to the rule.18 This Note disagrees, arguing that body camera
footage is inadmissible hearsay that may be offered either as a present
sense impression or as corroborative evidence of an officer's in-court
testimony.
This Note argues that the most effective way to address
reliability dangers posed by body camera footage is by treating each
video as the recording officer's statement under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801.19 Thus, if the recording officer does not testify, courts
should treat the video as inadmissible hearsay. If the officer instead
takes the stand and testifies that she recorded the video and that its
depictions are accurate, then she authenticates the video-rendering
it admissible as long as it is not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted or falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. 20 Part I of
this Note assesses the current state of hearsay jurisprudence and
analyzes when discretion to present conduct or human framing of
nonverbal events creates a "statement." Part II argues that current
authentication procedures for video evidence alone are inadequate to
ensure that police body camera footage is reliable. Part III argues
that an officer's decision to activate a body camera is assertive conduct
sufficient to constitute a statement and is thus hearsay. Part IV

See David K. Bakardjiev, Comment, Officer Body-Worn Cameras-Capturing
16.
Objective Evidence with Quality Technology and Focused Policies, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 88-89
(2015).
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
17.
18.
Dru'S. Letourneau, Comment, Police Body Cameras:Implementation with Caution,
Forethought, and Policy, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439, 461 (2015) ("Though records produced by
officer-worn cameras may themselves be, or at least contain, hearsay statements, they could
have the effect of making the actions of officers a matter of public record.").
FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining a "statement" as "a person's oral assertion, written
19.
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.").
See id. 801(c)(2) (defining "hearsay" as a statement offered "to prove the truth of the
20.
matter asserted."); id. 802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible unless a statute or rule permits
admission).
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proposes that courts remedy the "hearsay dangers" 2 1 that body camera
footage presents by considering two frameworks for admissibility. If
the footage is admitted as a present sense impression, the officer who
wore the camera that generated the footage that the prosecution seeks
to introduce must testify and be available for cross-examination, due
to Confrontation Clause concerns. The footage is then admissible as
substantive evidence.
Alternatively, a prosecutor may offer the
footage as corroborative of the officer's testimony, which legitimizes
the officer's oral account. If the footage is admitted as corroborative
evidence, the recording officer must likewise testify and be available
for cross-examination. This would convert the body camera footage
into nonhearsay evidence, offered not for the truth of the matter
asserted but instead to corroborate the officer's testimony. Under both
frameworks, the defendant may effectively challenge the narrative
presented to the jury via cross-examination and the prosecutor may
still reap the benefits of body camera footage. Part V analyzes the
practical implications of each framework.
While this Note addresses the inadequacy of authentication
procedures for body camera footage, it acknowledges that the failure of
one evidentiary safeguard does not necessarily mean that another is
more appropriate. Indeed, evidence containing hearsay must also be
authenticated.
But in the context of body camera footage,
authentication's inability to ensure reliable evidence indicates that
something more is required. This Note posits that the "something
more" is the safeguards present in the hearsay rules.
Finally, it is crucial to note that for body camera videos, the
assertive conduct is the creation of the video, not the conduct depicted
in the video.
Courts often use imprecise language in opinions
addressing hearsay conduct depicted within videos by referring to the
conduct in the video as the video itself.2 2 In this Note, "the video"
means the actual body camera video resulting from the officer's choice
to record a suspect's conduct. This Note will not address whether a
suspect's conduct itself is assertive as depicted in the video, as the
inquiry will vary case by case and is highly fact dependent.

21.
Such dangers include "insincerity, inarticulateness, erroneous memory, and faulty
perception." Roth, supra note 5, at 1985.
22.
See Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977). But
see State v. Steinle ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 372 P.3d 939, 944 (Ariz. 2016) (distinguishing
correctly between a third party's cell phone video recording and the defendant's "conduct"
depicted in the video).
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I. DEFINING THE BOUNDS OF HEARSAY

The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) broadly define hearsay as
encompassing intentional assertions ranging from verbal and written
utterances to an actor's nonverbal conduct. 23 Determining whether a
piece of evidence is a statement by a person is a threshold inquiry to
the hearsay question that may later arise. 24 If the court finds that
proposed testimony is a statement by a person pursuant to Rule
801(a), then it begins the hearsay analysis outlined in Rules 802 and
803.25 As Rule 801(a) makes clear, any conduct by a person intended
as an assertion qualifies as a statement. 26 This in-depth inquiry is
necessary before analyzing body camera footage under the various
hearsay frameworks. As Part II explains, understanding where the
FRE draw the line for what is and is not hearsay-and why-is crucial
to classifying body camera footage.
As technology evolves, so does the jurisprudence surrounding
the definition of prohibited "statements." 27 With the proliferation of
video recording comes the question of who the declarant is-and if it is
a machine, can a machine actually intend to assert something? The
overwhelming answer from courts is "no," except in a few unique
instances. 28
If the court finds that the proposed testimony is a machinegenerated statement rather than a person's statement, then the
statement is not hearsay. 29 In such cases, the court turns to
authentication 30 to ensure reliability. 31 When dealing with images or
data produced by unmanned machineS 32 or machines that require
minimal human activation, most courts turn to a "silent witness"
theory of authentication. 3 3 Some scholars rightly acknowledge that
23.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
24.
See id.
See id. 801-03.
25.
See id. 801(a) ('Statement' means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or
26.
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion." (emphasis added)).
See infra Part I.A.
27.
See infra Part I.A.
28.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c).
29.
See id. 901.
30.
Roth, supra note 5, at 2008-09.
31.
Surveillance cameras are often silent witnesses because they record without human
32.
operation, input, or interference. See infra Part I.A; see also People v. Harvey, Nos. 319482,
319483, 2015 WL 8953522, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015); People v. Ham, 993 N.Y.S.2d
645, 2014 WL 2438434, at *3 (Crim. Ct. 2014) ("[T]he visual component of a videotape is not
usually hearsay."); People v. Patten, 927 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545-46 (City Ct. 2011).
In 1979, for example, the Court of Appeals of Indiana adopted the silent witness
33.
theory, noting that it was joining "good company" because of the numerous jurisdictions that
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photographs and video are easily manipulated by framing, light,
angle, and a host of other factors controlled by the human operator of
the camera; 34 a more critical admission process should reflect these
realities. 35 As the Section below explains, courts have yet to adopt
this nuanced consideration in applying the silent witness theory. 36
A. Not Hearsay:Nonhuman Statements Offered for the Truth of the
Matter Asserted
As technology becomes more pervasive within the court system,
courts struggle to adapt their analyses to the role of machines in
evidence production.37 Because a statement is made "by a person"
according to Rule 801, most courts do not consider machine output a
statement. 38 For example, the Court of Appeals of Michigan flatly
refused to consider machine output as statements in People v. Dinardo
because "a machine is not a person and therefore not a declarant
capable of making a statement." 39
When a court finds that a statement is a machine's, it avoids
hearsay analysis altogether. 40 Even though courts do not classify this
evidence as hearsay, they still subject it to reliability safeguards
through authentication. 41 Authentication may be satisfied through
the testimony of a witness with knowledge 42 or through the silent
witness theory. With roots in Rule 901, which permits authentication

previously adopted the theory. See Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
(citing to nineteen jurisdictions, both federal and state).
34.
Roth, supra note 5, at 2007-08 (suggesting that authentication is sufficient to
address those concerns); Silbey, supra note 11, at 555.
35.
See Silbey, supra note 6, at 19.
36.
Id. at 25.
37.
See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: PhotographicEvidence and the Power
of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 54 (1998) (explaining that since photographs first gained
popularity, courts have struggled to analogize them to other types of evidence and create a
framework for admissibility).
38.
FED. R. EVID. 801; see, e.g., United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107,
1109-10 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Here, the relevant assertion isn't made by a person; it's made by the
Google Earth program."); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The
physician's diagnosis is testimonial, but the lab's raw results are not, because data are not
'statements' in any useful sense."); Boothe ex rel. K.C. v. Sherman, 190 F. Supp. 3d 788, 793
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (collecting cases) ("Thus, the time stamps on the video footage, which are raw
data generated by a machine rather than statements by a declarant, are not hearsay.").
39.
People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
40.
See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 80 1(a).
41.
FED. R. EVID. 901; see, e.g., United States v. Perea, No. 4:16-CR-00176-MAC-CAN,
2018 WL 771361, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) ("A party seeking to admit an item into
evidence-including a video recording-must first establish the item's genuineness.").
42.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
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through testimony about the reliability of a "process," 43 the silent
witness theory allows a witness without knowledge of the events
recorded but with knowledge of the device's reliability to authenticate
the evidence. 44 Courts do not subject photographs taken by humans to
silent witness analysis as long as a witness with knowledge can testify
that the photograph is a fair and accurate depiction of what the
proponent purports it to show. 45 In the alternative, courts often admit
photographs without a sponsoring witness because a photograph is
self-authenticating-it can "speak for itself."4 6 Under the silent
witness theory, the inquiry shifts: a witness who can testify to the
mechanics of the instrument that make the output reliable replaces
the reliability of a witness with actual knowledge of the event
depicted. 47 Notably, though, courts usually employ the silent witness
theory only when there is no witness with actual knowledge of the
events available to testify. 48 This often is the case when motion or
some other triggering event automatically activates the camera in
question. 49 The application of the silent witness theory is logical
because automatic activation leading to a recording is akin to a
machine's declaration that "something noteworthy is going on and
here is what actually happened."
In United States v. Taylor, the US Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit addressed the admissibility of film (and the resulting
contact prints) produced by a surveillance camera that bank robbers
automatically triggered after they locked bank employees inside a
vault during a robbery.50 Trapped in the vault, the employees were
unable to authenticate the images as they did not see what happened

43.
Id. 901(b)(9).
United States v. Harris, 55 M.J. 433, 436 (C.A.A.F. 2001) ("This theory allows
44.
authentication of photographs by the reliability of the process that created them, without the
need of a human witness to the events shown by the film."). In Harris, the court also discussed
that Rule 901(b)(9) of the Military Rules of Evidence, which has substantially the same text as
FRE 901, supports the silent witness theory. Id. at 438-39; see also FED. R. EVID. 901.
Id. at 438; see FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind.
45.
Ct. App. 1979).
Roth, supra note 5, at 2009.
46.
Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Silent Witness
47.
Theory, 116 A.L.R.5th 373, § 2[a] (2004).
See JORDAN S. GRUBER, Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence, in 16
48.
AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts 493, § 5 (2018). Otherwise, the witness authenticating the video would
have knowledge of the events, and the video would most likely be illustrative evidence, rather
than substantive. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 961 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Md. 2008) ("In the instant
case, the State offered the videotape and still photographs as probative evidence in themselves,
and not as illustrative evidence to support the testimony of an eye-witness.").
49.
50.

Farrell, supranote 47, § 2[a].
United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1976).
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during the rest of the robbery. 51 The proponent instead authenticated
the images through a witness who "testified as to the manner in which
the film was installed in the camera, how the camera was activated,
the fact that the film was removed immediately after the robbery, the
chain of its possession, and the fact that it was properly developed and
contact prints [were] made from it."52 Though the court did not
mention silent witness theory by name, federal and state courts
consistently consider these factors as indicia of reliability for silent
witnesses. 53
B. Not Hearsay:Filmic DemonstrativeEvidence
1. Generally
When there is a sponsoring witness, courts often admit video
evidence as demonstrative evidence. 54
When a witness with
knowledge of certain events takes the stand to testify as to the events,
she may utilize a demonstrative aid to help convey her testimony to
the jury.5 5
Demonstrative evidence falls in an evidentiary
in-between-the proponent does not offer it to prove a fact by itself;
rather, the proponent uses the demonstrative evidence to
communicate a concept to the jury, making the underlying testimony
more digestible.5 6
Demonstrative evidence therefore carries no
probative value of its own-a witness has to give it meaning.57 An
expert may present a chart to explain a complicated concept, for

51.
Id. at 641.
52.
Id. at 641-42.
53.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 55 M.J. 433, 438-39 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (adopting the
silent witness theory for military courts, as long as the following elements are satisfied: "(1) the
system was reliable; (2) the system was in working order when the photo was taken; and (3) the
film was handled and safeguarded properly from the time it was removed from the camera until
the time of trial"); State v. Haight-Gyuro, 186 P.3d 33, 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (collecting cases).
The mechanics, triggering events, and post-collection process are the cornerstones of the
analysis. E.g., Harris, 55 M.J. at 438-39; Haight-Gyuro, 186 P.3d at 36.
54.

See KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

5172.6 (2d ed.

2017) (collecting cases). For a general description of demonstrative evidence, see VICTOR JAMES
GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6164(a) n.97 (2d ed. 2017) ("The term
'demonstrative evidence' refers to a tangible item, such as a chart, diagram, or a courtroom
reenactment of an event, that illustrates the testimony of a witness.").
55.
GOLD, supra note 54 § 6164(a).
56.
See id.; see also Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610-11 (D.
Alaska 1977) (explaining that demonstrative evidence is generally admissible because "the
verifying witness is merely using the film as a means of communicating his observations").
57.
See GRAHAM, supra note 54, § 5172; GRUBER, supra note 48, § 5 ("The traditional
view of real, demonstrative, photographic evidence was that it had no independent significance
apart from its ability to illustrate facts testified to by a witness.").
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example.5 8 As a result, the jury cannot review demonstrative evidence
during deliberations. 5 9 The following overview of filmic demonstrative
evidence identifies the purpose of demonstrative evidence and its
practical limitations in the courtroom. Identifying the line where
demonstrative evidence becomes assertive and thus hearsay provides
necessary context for analyzing the evidentiary status of body camera
footage.
2. After-the-Fact Videos: When Evidence Becomes Assertive and Not
Demonstrative
Attorneys utilize video technology to introduce creative types of
demonstrative evidence of their clients' injuries. 60 Sometimes, the
filmic evidence crosses the line into substantive evidence rather than
demonstrative. 6 ' "Day in the life" videos, for example, often cross that
62
line. First utilized in early 1970s civil litigation, a plaintiff may
present a "day in the life" video during a trial's damages portion to
establish pain and suffering. 63 When words will not adequately
convey the effect of an injury on a plaintiff, the videos allow plaintiffs
to show the jury day-to-day hardships they face. 64 When damages
include pain and suffering, videos may include depictions of plaintiffs
struggling to perform daily tasks or experiencing pain during
rehabilitative medical treatments. 65
When a party introduces a video that crosses the line from
being illustrative of a witness's testimony to assertive of substantive
evidence, the contents of the video may be a "statement" and thus
inadmissible hearsay. 66 In Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability

See State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 193 (Wash. 1991).
58.
See Maureen A. Howard & Jeffery C. Barnum, Bringing Demonstrative Evidence in
59.
from the Cold: The Academy's Role in Developing Model Rules, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 513, 516 (2016)
(citing Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. De C.V., 730 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2013)); Jennifer
L. Mnookin, Repeat Play Evidence: Jack Weinstein, "Pedagogical Devices," Technology, and
Evidence, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 581 (2015).
See Jane A. Kalinski, Note, Jurors at the Movies: Day-in-the-Life Videos as Effective
60.
Evidentiary Tool or Unfairly PrejudicialDevice?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 789, 790, 801 (1993).
See GRAHAM, supra note 54, § 5172.
61.
The earliest judicial references to "day in the life" videos appeared in Fruit v.
62.
Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 143 (Alaska 1972), and Ward v. Hester, 288 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1972), aff'd, 303 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio 1973).
Kalinski, supra note 60, at 790, 801.
63.
See id. at 797-98.
64.
See id. at 789.
65.
See Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977).
66.
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Insurance Co., 6 7 a federal district court held that depictions in a "day
in the life" video crossed the threshold into substantive evidence,
acknowledging the assertive intent of the plaintiffs supposed
demonstrative evidence.6 8 The "day in the life" video depicted the
plaintiff doing daily activities around his home and also included two
sections where he performed movement tests related to his injury. 69
Unfortunately, the Grimes court skirted the question of
whether the video itself was hearsay-even though it wrote the video
is hearsay, the court based its reasoning on the assertive conduct
depicted in the video. 70 The court found that the conduct depicted in
the video was clearly assertive because the plaintiff knew he was
being filmed and knew that the purpose of the filming was to convey
his daily struggles to the jury.7 1 It admitted the video's contents
under the residual exception to hearsay 72 because of the "[g]uarantees
of trustworthiness" present-mainly the plaintiffs availability for
cross-examination. 7 3 It is unclear whether the court employed this
analysis, rather than admitting the video as demonstrative evidence,
because the plaintiff sought to introduce the video as substantive
evidence of pain and suffering rather than demonstrative evidence. 74
Demonstrative evidence constantly evolves with technology.75
More recently, attorneys working closely with medical experts have
developed unique methods for injured plaintiffs to recreate their
injuries for a jury.7 6 For example, in Devadas v. Niksarli, an attorney
recruited a photo-editing specialist to alter a photograph of a scene to
reflect how the plaintiff would see it after a failed LASIK procedure.7 7

67.
Id. Grimes highlights the in-between status of filmic demonstrative evidence. While
usually offered as illustrative demonstrative evidence, the normal dangers of filmic evidence
(framing, discretionary presentation, and lack of context) lurk in the background and may, at a
tipping point, become assertive. See id.; Kalinski, supra note 60, at 816.
68.
See Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
69.
Id. at 609.
70.
See id. at 610-11. The court probably avoided that hearsay question because the
video itself was authenticated by the plaintiff and the videographer through the silent witness
theory. See id. at 609.
71.
See id. at 611 ("[A] film offered by the plaintiff showing the plaintiff performing
tasks to exhibit his disability is like a witness testifying about assertive conduct.").
72.
See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 807.
73.
Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
74.
See id. at 610-11.
75.
Caitlin 0. Young, Note, Employing Virtual Reality Technology at Trial: New Issues
Posed by Rapid Technological Advances and Their Effects on Jurors'Search for "The Truth", 93
TEX. L. REV. 257, 259 (2014).
76.

NEAL FEIGENSON, EXPERIENCING OTHER MINDS IN THE COURTROOM 2 (2016).

77.

Id. at 35-36.
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Corroboration by a sponsoring witness is paramount for
evidence purporting to be "demonstrative."7 8 Neal Feigenson criticizes
these subjective forms of demonstrative evidence not only because
they present themselves as "independent proof' of harm under the
guise of demonstrative evidence 79 but also because they are unreliably
"grounded" only in the accuracy of the witness who guides the expert's
In Smith v. Jones, an attorney
creation of the simulation.8 0
commissioned a videographer to create depictions of the plaintiffs
visual condition."' Unlike in Devadas, the plaintiffs ophthalmologist,
who had conducted visual field tests on the plaintiff, was able to
82
confirm the reliability independent of the plaintiffs testimony.
Comparing Devadas, where the exhibit's accuracy rested solely upon
the plaintiffs word, to Smith, where the demonstrative evidence was
objectively verifiable, Feigenson's concerns are warranted. 83 Without
a witness to corroborate the demonstrative evidence's accuracy, the
84
evidence resembles "proof' of a plaintiffs condition or, in the most
85
extreme case, a plaintiffs assertive statement.
Even when simulative demonstrative evidence can be
corroborated, the evidence may go too far by "invit[ing] jurors to
occupy the plaintiffs position."8 6 One potential check on this danger is
to balance the probative value of the video against the danger of
unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403.87 The Tenth Circuit adopted
this approach in Bannister v. Town of Noble for a "day in the life"
video, where the court did not conduct a hearsay analysis but instead
found that the probative value of the film outweighed the danger of
The court found that the
unfair prejudice to the defendant.8 8

See Karen D. Butera, Seeing Is Believing: A Practitioner'sGuide to the Admissibility
78.
of Demonstrative Computer Evidence, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 514-15 (1998) ("Unlike
substantive evidence, demonstrative evidence can only illustrate or explain other testimonial,
documentary or real evidence."); see also FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 128.

For an argument that parallels Jessica Silbey's criticism of how courts treat
79.
substantive filmic evidence, see FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 34, 39. See also Silbey, supra note
6.
Edward Cheng, Neal Feigenson, Experiencing Other Minds in the Courtroom,
80.
EXCITED UTTERANCE 12:12 (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.excitedutterancepodcast.com/
EXCITED
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/DFX6-L7LC]
listen/2017/9/25/34-neal-feigenson
UTTERANCE] (discussing the same case studies).
FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 73-74.
81.
Id. at 74.
82.
83.

See EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 80, at 16:50.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 128.
See id. at 26 n.12; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 80, at 20:10.
See FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 136.
Bannister v. Town of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1987).
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plaintiffs availability for cross-examination mitigated the danger of
prejudice and affirmed the admission of the video. 89 This analysis
mimics the Grimes court's residual exception language, 90 though
notably does not require classifying the plaintiffs conduct in the "day
in the life" video as an assertive statement subject to Rule 802.
Courts often purport to admit videos as demonstrative evidence
but draw facts from them as if the videos are substantive evidence.9 1
The murky nature of demonstrative testimony makes the scope of the
permitted use unclear. 92 The problem, then, is that courts do not
adequately screen filmic demonstrative evidence for reliability. 93
Jessica Silbey, who has written extensively on the persuasive nature
of filmic evidence, highlights the particularly assertive nature of crime
scene footage created by investigators after the fact. 94
Silbey
eventually concludes that all filmic evidence is assertive in nature 95
because of the assertive nature of "light, angle [including
point-of-view], focus, and editing"96 inherently present in video
production. Body camera footage is a clear example of filmic evidence
that is inherently assertive because the body camera is supposed to
capture an entire interaction from the beginning of suspicion to the
apprehension of a suspect or conclusion of the encounter. 97 However,
the assertive factors that Silbey identifies are even more prevalent in
body camera footage than after-the-fact crime scene footage. The
perspective of the footage and the fact that the footage presents only

89.

Id. at 1270-71.

90.
Compare Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977)
(finding video admissible under FRE 803(24) (now 807) based on its probative value, timeliness,
and accuracy and based on the fact that the plaintiff depicted in the video was available to be
cross-examined), with Bannister, 812 F.2d at 1269-70 (finding video admissible under FRE 403
after considering the accuracy of the film, its self-serving nature, the dominating nature of film
evidence, and the availability of cross examination).
91.
GRAHAM, supra note 54, § 5127 & n.17; Silbey, supra note 11, at 499.
92.
See Silbey, supra note 11, at 502.
93.
Id. at 505-06.
94.
Id. at 542-57 (describing, in detail, the assertive nature of films admitted in a
variety of cases).
95.
Id. at 499.
96.
Id. at 555.
97.
See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, POLICE
BODY WORN CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD 5 (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/

pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf
[https://perma.cclD2ZJ-E2HR] ("One of the main selling points for [body] cameras is their
potential to provide transparency into some police interactions . . . ."); Silbey, supra note 11, at
499 (describing the inherently assertive nature of police produced films).
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one side of an interaction are features inherent in body camera footage
that influence the narrative. 98
In one instance, Silbey describes a crime scene video recorded
walking through a house where a burglar killed the
investigator
by an
9
9
The court admitted the video as demonstrative
homeowner.
evidence.10 0 Silbey noted that even after the court rendered the audio
portion inadmissible, the court failed to consider the assertive nature
of the video when admitting it into evidence: "[T]here remained a
narrated and opinionated content to the film from the perspective of
the camera: its focus, angle, and movement; and, unlike the
photographs, the film told a purposeful and pointed story about the
violence of the burglary from the point of view of the filming,
investigative officer." 0 1 The concurring judge in the case agreed,
writing separately to criticize the filmic evidence's testimonial
nature. 102
C. InadmissibleHearsay: Statements by a Person
To be hearsay, a statement must belong to a person.1 03
Because people communicate in ways beyond simple verbal
utterances, hearsay jurisprudence evolved to ensure the reliability of
all statements by people, both verbal and nonverbal.1 04 The one
element that each type of statement shares is assertive intent: the
declarant intends to convey a certain message with her actions, words,
or lack thereof.1 05 This Section analyzes discretionary actions' role in
establishing assertive conduct.
The FRE define a statement as "a person's oral assertion,
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an

See Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES
98.
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html
[https://perma.cclMNQ7-WRKB] (illustrating the inherent bias of police body cameras through a
variety of videos).
Silbey, supra note 11, at 512-15.
99.
Id. at 514 ("The first justification fairly explains the filmic proffer as demonstrative
100.
evidence, while the second one suggests the film is testimonial or substantive evidence of some
kind, but fails to explain the basis for admitting an out of court statement for the facts and truth
it asserts.").
Id. at 547.
101.
Id. at 548 (citing Virgin Islands v. Albert, 241 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2001) (Fullam,
102.
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
103.
104.
See id.
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules
105.
("Some nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly
the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement.").
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assertion." 106 Thus, the cornerstone of a "statement" is the declarant's
assertive intent.1 0 7 Without the intention to communicate, even a
verbal utterance is not, as a matter of law, a statement. Precedent
widely accepts that nonverbal actions can constitute hearsay as long
as the actor intended to assert something by her action.
The classic example of discerning communicative action is the
ship captain dicta from Wright v. Tatham,10 8 where the judge posited a
hypothetical situation about a ship captain preparing his ship for
voyage.
The judge explained that the captain's inspection and
subsequent boarding of the ship would be hearsay if a witness testified
to it because it would be offered for the purpose of asserting that the
captain believed the ship was seaworthy. 10 9 But the FRE look for
more than the existence of such an inference before excluding
nonverbal conduct as hearsay: they look for the actor's intent to
communicate. 110 The FRE would only consider the Wright captain's
conduct hearsay if the captain intended to use his inspection and
decision to board the ship to communicate to onlookers that the ship
was safe.11 1 The distinction is logical because if the actor does not
mean to communicate something to an audience, then the traditional
hearsay risk of insincerity disappears. 112
In certain instances of nonverbal conduct, discerning the
actor's assertive intent is relatively straightforward. Nodding one's
head in response to a question indicates that the declarant answers in
the affirmative.1 1 3 Pointing to a suspect in a lineup is hearsay because
the actor intended for her actions to convey that the suspect to whom
she points is the perpetrator. 114 Similarly, a child pointing to sensitive
106.

FED. R. EVID. 801(a) ('Statement' means a person's oral assertion, written assertion,

or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion." (emphasis added)).
107.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules ("The key to
the definition is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.").
108.
Paul F. Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
275, 277-78 (2001) (citing Wright v. Tatham (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (KB)).
109.
Id.
110.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a); Kirgis, supra note 108, at 281-84.
111.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a), Kirgis, supra note 108, at 282.
112.
Kirgis, supra note 108, at 283. Paul Kirgis is less convinced that sincerity should be
the chief concern for hearsay evidence. See id. at 282-83. Instead, he posits that "modern
cognitive research teaches that problems of misperception and poor memory are probably much
more significant ..... Id. Kirgis also questions whether courts should derive a declarant's intent
from a subjective or objective standard based on her nonverbal actions. Id. at 292-94.
113.
See, e.g., United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The 'nods'
clearly tended to subject Chrisanthou to criminal liability-by affirmative nod he admitted
complicity in the criminal undertaking.").
114.
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules ("Some
nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly the
equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement.").
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areas on a doll in the presence of a social worker is hearsay because
the child intends to convey that something happened to her body at
those locations.11 5 All of these recognized instances of nonverbal
hearsay have a common feature: the presence of an audience.1 16
Thus, the two key components in nonverbal hearsay analysis
are (1) the presence of an audience and (2) the affirmative choice of
the declarant to do some act with knowledge of the significance
attached to it.117 In all of the examples above, the declarant made a
conscious choice to move her body in a way that objectively
communicates to a third party with knowledge that the third party is
present. As a further example, take a man's choice to don a wedding
ring in public.1 18 If the man intended to wear the ring to signal to
others that he is in a committed relationship, then the nonverbal
conduct has all the markings of hearsay.1 19 A court would thus
prohibit a witness from testifying to the truth of the matter asserted,
which is that the ring proves that the man is in a committed
relationship.
Technology challenges the way that the FRE approach hearsay
analysis. New forms of communication stretch the boundaries of
"statements" and communicative intent. However, other aspects of
technological communication still fit well within existing hearsay
analysis. The fixed and mechanistic nature of text messages, emails,
and other social media posts seems more reliable than the strictly
verbal hearsay of the past partly because the virtual world preserves

Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1986), overruled on other
115.
grounds by B.B. v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007) ("There is no recognized exception
to the hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their investigations. This includes the
pointing and demonstrating performed by the child in the presence of the social worker, using a
so-called 'anatomically correct' doll, because hearsay includes 'nonverbal conduct of a person, if it
is intended by him as an assertion."').
See Kirgis, supra note 108, at 291; see also Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV.
116.
7, 40 & n.127 (2013) ("For example, diary entries, memos-to-file, draft emails or 'notes to self'
could constitute 'statements,' but not 'communications' if the statements, when uttered, were not
intended for any audience.").
This is where the FRE differ from the Wright court's analysis. Compare FED. R.
117.
EVID. 801, with Wright v. Tatham (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (KB). The presence of an audience
alone is not enough to transform action into hearsay. Kirgis, supra note 108, at 291-92.
See Peter Nicolas, Left Hand, Third Finger: The Wearing of Wedding (or Other)
118.
Rings as a Form of Assertive Conduct Under the Hearsay Rule, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 526,
534-35 (2009).
Id. at 534-35, 537 (noting that the nonverbal act of wearing, or possibly even not
119.
removing, a wedding ring satisfies the definition of hearsay). This example poses an interesting
hypothetical for Kirgis's discussion about discerning communicative intent with subjective
versus objective standards. See Kirgis, supra note 108, at 292-94. Peter Nicolas's discussion of
the different cultural norms that inform where and when people wear wedding rings seems to
advocate for an objective standard. See Nicolas, supra note 118, at 533-34.
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them in their original form indefinitely. 1 20 But this distinction is
superficial since books, reports, affidavits, medical records, and letters
also exist in a fixed medium, yet courts still treat them as
hearsay-and for good reason. Fabrication or memory failure is not
the ultimate concern with these types of evidence.
Rather, the
broader inability to cross-examine the declarant remains the chief
danger.121
II. BODY CAMERA FOOTAGE UNDER CURRENT EVIDENTIARY
FRAMEWORKS

The following Section applies the evidentiary frameworks
defined in Part I to body camera footage. By comparing body camera
footage to evidence normally authenticated under the silent witness
theory or admitted as demonstrative evidence, this Note examines
whether those safeguards are sufficient to ensure that body camera
footage is reliable. This Note concludes they are not, for body camera
footage is more akin to a hearsay statement than are videos of the
past.
A. A Primeron Body Cameras
US police departments began implementing body camera
policies largely in response to police shootings and claims of police
brutality when video footage was released in a significant number of
cases showing the police fabricated accounts of the deadly encounters
after-the-fact. 12 2
Many citizens-93 percent according to one
survey-view body cameras as a tool for police accountability, 12 3 and
police departments view the cameras as both a crime-fighting tool and
as proof that their officers acted properly in citizen encounters. 124
Most body cameras are always on and gathering visual data,
waiting to be activated by an officer. 125 Some come equipped with a
"preevent buffer," during which the camera can recall up to two
120.
Bellin, supra note 116, at 19-20.
121.
Cf. id. at 19-20, 24 (focusing on the fixed nature of statements in electronic media as
mitigating some reliability concerns).
122.
See No TAPE, No TESTIMONY, supranote 7, at 1-4.
123.
Id. at 8 (citing Rich Morin & Renee Stepler, The Racial Confidence Gap in Police
Performance, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/theracial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance/ [https://perma.cc/U87J-8MRV]).
124.
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE EXEC. RES. F.,
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 6
(2014) https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf_[https://perma.cc/
VRB7-76SH].
125.
E.g., HURLEY, supra note 2.
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minutes of footage recorded before an officer activates the camera. 126
In these body cameras, if the officer does not activate the camera after
a preprogrammed amount of time (which departments set), then the
data are erased. 127 The Baltimore police had their preevent buffer
configured to thirty seconds, resulting in the controversial footage
discussed above. 128 When an officer presses the button to activate the
camera, the camera begins recording audio as soon as it is activated
and saves the video data beginning at the preevent buffer time. 129
Departmental policies vary regarding the amount of discretion
an officer has to activate the body camera. 130 The most common
variant is the limited discretion policy. 131 In these departments,
"police are directed to record specified enforcement activities and
given discretion over whether to record at other times." 132 All of the
departments define certain situations that should trigger mandatory
activations. 133 Usually this happens in a written departmental policy,
containing a broad statement such as, "Bearing this in mind, all user
officers/supervisors who arrive on a scene or engage in an enforcement
contact must place their VIEVU PVR- LE2 camera in the 'On/Record'
Mode as soon as it is safe and practical to do so."134 For the aid of the
officers, the policies usually list certain triggering events, after which
officers are expected to record.135
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law
School found that some common triggers listed in departmental
policies across the country are as follows:
1.

All calls for service and while en-route to emergency calls.

2.

Pedestrian stops, including consensual encounters and "Terry stops" (a
brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of
involvement in criminal activity).

126.

Id.

127.

AxON

ENTER.,

AXON

BODY

2

(2017),

https://prismic-io.s3.amazonaws.com/

axon%2F342f04af-f9bc-4971-a7bf-28f2d7896945_04172017+product+card+-+axon+body+2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EY94-PEZF].
Fenton & Rector, supra note 1.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
For a collection of links to departmental policies, see Police Body Camera Policies:

Recording Circumstances,supra note 9.

Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
131.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 931-32 (2017).
Id. at 931.
132.
Id.
133.
134.

See, e.g., PHX. POLICE DEP'T, BODY WORN VIDEO TECHNOLOGY-PILOT 2 (2013),

https://static.spokanecity.org/documents/police/accountability/bodycamera/phoenix-policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4VT-T6FE].
Fan, supra note 131, at 931-32.
135.
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3.

Traffic stops.

4.

Foot and vehicle pursuits.

5.

Consensual or warrantless searches.

6.

Executing search warrants.

7.

Arrests and detentions.

8.

Transports (driving with a prisoner).

9.

Other adversarial encounters or situations where criminal activity is
13 6
likely to be recorded.

Notably, the officer does not activate the camera until after the
triggering event occurs. Therefore, the triggering event is rarely, or
more likely never, recorded on the video. This is relevant to analyzing
which evidentiary category body camera footage falls into because the
officer activates her camera in response to these particular guidelines.
B. Body Camera as a (Not So) Silent Witness: The Shortcomings of
Authentication
Body cameras are distinct from types of machine output
routinely authenticated under the silent witness theory.
Human
influence is less likely to taint outputs from machine and camera
"silent witnesses" than body camera footage.
Unlike automated
security cameras, 13 7 humans directly operate body cameras and the
video produced is intended to depict what the human operator
experiences. 138 All machines require and rely on human input at some
level. 139 Computers and forensic machines function as a result of
human coding, 140 like cameras capturing a picture of where the human
operator aims. 14 1 Some scholars argue that this level of human input
should subject the products of these machines to a more rigorous
admissibility standard than traditional authentication. 14 2 This Note
agrees. Courts largely ignore the nuance of this argument, electing
instead to believe that forms of machine testimony are not fallible like
136.
Police Body CameraPolicies:Recording Circumstances,supra note 9.
137.
See United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1976).
138.
See supra Part II.A.
139.
Roth, supra note 5, at 1976-78.
140.
Id. at 1977-78.
141.
See Mnookin, supra note 37, at 21 (noting that early photographers emphasized their
role in the photographic process, which required extensive retouching and manipulation of the
lens); Brian Sites, Rise of the Machines: Machine-GeneratedData and the Confrontation Clause,
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 36, 58-59 (2014) ("And at least for forensic photographs, the
images are often the photographer's assertion about reality: 'this is the crime scene,' 'this is the
wound at issue,' 'this is the defendant,' and so on.").
142.
Silbey, supra note 11, at 499.
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human statements are. 143 However, the case for heightened standards
is even stronger for body cameras.
The shortcomings of the silent witness theory are worth noting
before examining why body camera footage falls outside its bounds.
Such shortcomings are amplified in the body camera context, making
this theory of authentication inadequate to ensure the footage is
reliable. Viewed critically, silent witnesses are subject to human
manipulation-especially when considering the degree of human
control operators have over a machine. 144 Jennifer Mnookin notes that
in early photographic evidentiary jurisprudence, judges were hesitant
to admit photographic evidence because parties could not
Likewise, it is impossible to
cross-examine the photograph. 145
a sponsoring witness. 146
without
footage
cross-examine body camera
The authentication requirement attempted to remedy this evidentiary
shortcoming. The most effective avenue for authentication is the
production of a "witness with knowledge" of the content of the picture
for testimony and cross-examination. 147 The silent witness theory,
though, does not guarantee a witness for a defendant to cross-examine
with specific knowledge of the relevant facts to contextualize a body
camera video for the jury. 148 While some view photographs and videos
as objective, 149 that view overlooks the human input that produced
them.1 50

See People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ill. 1985) ("There can be no question
143.
that computer science has created many devices, the reliability of which can scarcely be
questioned. We should therefore apply the rule that its accuracy and reliability is judicially
noticeable, requiring only proof of the accuracy and proper operation of the particular device
under consideration."); State v. Pulphus, 465 A.2d 153, 161 (R.I. 1983) ("We believe there is no
logic in excluding a photograph that records an event with minute accuracy and precision, when
the taking of the photograph has been reliably established.").
See Roth, supra note 5, at 1977-78, 2007-08; Silbey, supra note 6, at 29-30.
144.
Mnookin, supra note 37, at 55.
145.
See Silbey, supra note 6, at 41-42 ("Obviously, a lawyer cannot literally cross146.
examine a film; rather, a lawyer either examines or cross-examines a witness about the film in
evidence.").
See FED. R. EVID. 901. Note the similarity between substituting the "witness with
147.
knowledge" of the factual depiction of the photograph's testimony and the silent witness theory's
substitution of a witness with knowledge of the camera's mechanical process. See id. Both
witnesses substitute their testimony for that of the photographer, who could presumably testify
to both the actual content of the photograph and the camera's mechanical reliability.
See supra Part I.A.
148.
See People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ill. 1985); State v. Pulphus, 465 A.2d
149.
153, 161 (R.I. 1983); No TAPE, No TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at 1-4.
Silbey, supra note 6, at 18.
150.
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1. Undue Perception of Objectivity and Completeness
Although video footage and photographs appear to present a
"mechanical objectivity" 15 1 independent of their operators, introducing
videos in criminal prosecutions does not always clear up factual
disputes. As Silbey states, a video of a police encounter "does not lie,"
but also "does not tell the whole story."1 52
Unlike evidence
authenticated via the silent witness theory, body camera footage is
incapable of "speaking for itself."1 53 As a result, Silbey asserts that
these types of contemporaneously recorded police videos are in need of
"explanation."1 5 4 The explanation would address natural but not
necessarily obvious questions that the jury should consider: What
happened outside of the camera frame? Does the camera's angle make
a subject appear closer, farther, larger, or otherwise different than
they would appear in real life?15 5 Such explanation is easy to come by
in police brutality claims where officers have a motive to take the
stand in their own defense, especially in light of the partially
subjective standards by which their conduct is judged. 156 The same is
not true when the prosecution introduces such footage against a
nonofficer criminal defendant. 15 7 If an officer does not testify, the
defendant cannot add narrative context through cross-examination.
Additionally, if an officer does not testify, the defendant may feel
undue pressure to take the stand to explain her version of events.1 58
Placing this burden on criminal defendants to take the stand
incentivizes defendants to waive their Fifth Amendment rights 159

151.
Mnookin, supra note 37, at 1-2.
152.
Jessica Silbey, Persuasive Visions: Film and Memory, 10 LAW CULTURE & HUM. 24,
33 (2014).
153.
See id. ContraRoth, supra note 5, at 2009.
154.
Silbey, supra note 152, at 33 (explaining that officer narration accompanying footage
in a police brutality case is necessary to understand the footage).
155.
See Note, ConsideringPolice Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1812-13 (2015)
[hereinafter ConsideringPoliceBody Cameras].
156.
See Silbey, supra note 152, at 33 (describing a case where the officers did testify);
David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Defense of Good Faith in Action for Damages Against Law
Enforcement Official Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, Providing for Liability of Person Who, Under
Color of Law, Subjects Another to Deprivationof Rights, 61 A.L.R. Fed. 7 (1983).
157.
As Mnookin rightly notes, parties cannot cross-examine a photograph. Mnookin,
supra note 37, at 55-56 (identifying the inability to cross-examine photographs as a possible
reason for historical judicial hesitancy to admit them). But see Silbey, supra note 11, at 548
(suggesting that courts instruct the jury to engage in cross-examination-like interrogation of the
video to remind the jury that the video is not an objective truth).
158.
See Fan, supra note 131, at 919.
159.
See id. at 914-15 (explaining the numerous reasons defendants may invoke their
Fifth Amendment right).
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when cross-examining a state witness-the police officer-would
achieve the same result.
Similarly, proponents of body camera footage emphasize their
ability to provide "objective" evidence of probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or consent to a search. 16 0 However, all of these standards
are notoriously fact intensive.1 61 Body camera footage is unlikely to
capture all of those facts, 162 since the cameras begin recording only
after certain triggering events 163 and capture only the recording
officer's point of view. For example, a key factor in whether a seizure
occurred is whether a suspect felt she could leave a police
encounter, 164 but that critical fact is unaccounted for by a police
officer's body camera video.
2. Human Interference with the "Silent Witness"
While courts have repeatedly held that cameras-both
manually operated and automatic-may be authenticated as silent
witnesses, 165 body cameras present a unique challenge to
authentication that is distinguishable from cameras of the past. First,
unlike typical surveillance cameras, body cameras are controlled by a
human actor who has a role in the adversarial process, so the footage
should be subject to more stringent reliability inquiries. Second, body
cameras are uniquely positioned to record from the officer's
perspective, subjecting the jury to potential cognitive biases.1 66 The
most effective way to remedy this cognitive bias is an effective
cross-examination of the officer wearing the camera. 167 Because of
both challenges, the footage is unable to "speak for itself"1 68 and the
testimony of a technician familiar with the camera, but who was not
operating it at the time of the recording, is unlikely to add value.
While Andrea Roth rejects the argument that machines bear
the credibility of their programmer, 169 body cameras are significantly
See ConsideringPolice Body Cameras, supra note 155, at 1803.
160.
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (assessing
161.
voluntariness of consent by considering the "totality of all the circumstances").
The Bustamonte Court considered factors like education, youth, intelligence,
162.
deprivation of sleep, and repeated nature of questioning that are unlikely to be represented on
body camera footage. See id. at 226.
See supra Part II.A.
163.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
164.
See supra Part I.A.
165.
Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM.
166.
CRIM. L. REV. 791, 801 (2017).
See infra Part IV.
167.
See Roth, supranote 5, at 2009.
168.
Id. at 1986.
169.
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different from lab machines or automatically activated surveillance
cameras programmed prior to the event in question. Roth argues that
just because the programmer "has designed a machine to behold and
report events does not mean the programmer herself has borne
7 0 Therefore,
witness to those events."o
calling the programmer to the
stand is unnecessary. 171
However, body camera operators necessarily bear witness and
initiate the machine output, 1 7 2 distinguishing officers from Roth's
programmers.
Officers' testimony directly connects their own
operation of the body camera to the events they recorded.
The common vein that runs throughout the silent witness
analysis of videos is the lack of human interference with the recording
process. 173 With such machine statements, the recording function is
either always recording or triggered to record by an automated process
within the machine. 174 The same is not true for body camera footage,
which is triggered only by a human in response to human-recognized
triggering events. 175 Yet body camera videos prepared by a human for
law enforcement purposes are currently only subject to the same
authentication requirements as surveillance videos recorded in a
retail store's everyday operations.17 6
Body cameras capture a limited point of view: that of the
person wearing them. 17 7 This point of view has the potential to elicit
sympathy for the police officer from the jury, who will naturally
identify with the officer when viewing the image through the officer's
eyes.1 78 Body camera footage presents police-suspect interactions with
a "deceptive intensity" by reducing a confrontation to a singular lens
170.
Id.
Id.
171.
172.
See supra Part II.A.
173.
See supra Part I.A.
174.
See supra Part I.A.
175.
See supra Part II.A.
176.
See FED. R. EVID. 901.
177.
Fan, supra note 131, at 947.
178.
Id. at 948-49. In some jurisdictions, viewing the footage is almost literally seeing
"through an officer's eyes" because the cameras are mounted on their sunglasses. See Adam
Benforado,
The Hidden Bias of Cameras, SLATE
(Aug. 12, 2015,
1:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/jurisprudence/2015/08/police body-and dashboa
rdcameras how camera-perspective bias can limit.html [https://perma.cc/B245-8VAT]. Neal
Feigenson makes the same perspective-based warning for subjective demonstrative evidence
because of the danger that the jury literally sees through the plaintiffs perspective. EXCITED
UTTERANCE, supra note 80, at 20:50. A leading seller of body cameras, Axon, actually markets
their glasses-mounted body camera as "the leading point of view camera," advertising to officers
that, "[t]hat way, you'll be able to capture your perspective without feeling held back by your
camera." Axon Flex 2, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/flex-2 [https://perma.cc/7KFQ5CN5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
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17 9
Body
and presenting only the high-intensity parts of the encounter.
camera footage is naturally prone to this type of bias because of law
enforcement policy mandating activation of the camera only after
certain triggering events.1 80 The format of a narrative video also
181
In
raises potential "naive realism" cognitive biases in fact-finders.
other words, a jury may accept a video as objectively truthful rather
than perceiving its evidentiary limitations, such as lack of context or
perspective bias. 182
Perspective is a particularly salient consideration in the
criminal justice context when videos depict interactions between the
police and suspects or arrestees. Academics who study the effects of
camera positioning on police interrogation videos caution that even a
stationary video camera "should not be considered a passive
183
Variables
bystander, objectively recording what is said and done."
like camera angle and whom the camera focuses on affect the viewer's
perception of the subject's guilt and credibility-to the detriment of
the subject recorded. 184
Former police officer and current law professor Seth W.
Stoughton produced a video series that depicts how the framing and
perspective of body camera videos have the potential to portray false
or misleading narratives.1 8 5 One video, for example, depicts a suspect
from an officer's point of view, close up, and making jerky movements
near the officer. 186 Thirty-two percent of 80,858 New York Times
readers who watched the video believed the officer faced a "[v]ery
threatening" situation. 187 A second video of the same actions filmed
from a third party's perspective shows that the officer was actually
Stoughton's videos do not address
dancing with the suspect.1 88

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Morrison, supra note 166, at 800.
See supra Part II.A.
Morrison, supra note 166, at 801.
Id.
Sara Landstr6m, Emma Roos af Hjelmsater & Par Anders Granhag, The Camera

Perspective Bias: A Case Study, 4 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 199, 200

(2007).
Id.; Fan, supra note 131, at 947-48.
184.
Williams et al., supra note 98 (displaying Stoughton's video series).
185.
Id.
186.
To make the responses viewable, click on a response in the survey. Responses are
187.
still being tabulated through the survey, so the results may change over time. Id.; see Katie
Farden, Note, Recording a New Frontierin Evidence-Gathering:Police Body-Worn Cameras and
Privacy Doctrines in Washington State, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 271, 294 (2016) (reflecting a
similar percentage and sample size in the New York Times data when cited in 2016).
Williams et al., supra note 98.
188.
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possible shot-framing concerns that arise from officers having
discretion to turn cameras on and off-another potential concern. 189
Courts must be increasingly aware of body camera limitations
in these contexts, particularly when they are controlled by a human
actor.190 The most effective way for them to acknowledge these
limitations is to reject the silent witness theory of authentication as
independently sufficient to admit body camera footage into evidence.
Courts have yet to decide whether body cameras are silent
witnesses, 191 likely because it is widely accepted 92 that video evidence
falls within the silent witness category. However, silent witness
theory is inadequate to ensure the reliability of body camera footage
because the footage is distinguishable from videos of the past in both
its perspective and its operation.
C. Body Camera Footage Is Not Demonstrative Evidence
There is a tenuous argument that body camera videos are
demonstrative evidence. If a police officer testified that she was
present at the time the footage was recorded and that the body camera
footage would aid in explaining the events to the jury, the footage
might satisfy the definition of demonstrative evidence. 193 In this
scenario, treating body camera footage as demonstrative evidence
does, notably, remedy one concern that the footage presents: If the
footage is demonstrative evidence, the proponent would have to
produce a witness with knowledge to show it to the jury.1 94 A
defendant would then be able to cross-examine a witness with at least
some knowledge of the events depicted in the footage.
189.
See id.
190.
See Fan, supra note 131, at 947-48.
191.
A search done on April 8, 2018, using the terms (body /1 camera) & "silent witness"
in both Westlaw and LexisAdvance returned only two cases: Gemeil v. State, No. 05-K-1510807, 2017 WL 5171600, at *7 (1VId. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 8, 2017), and People v. Spencer, 2017 IL
App. (4th) 160569-U, ¶ 31 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 10, 2017). In Gemeil, the court mentioned body
camera footage in its factual summary of the case, but such footage was immaterial to the issue
on appeal regarding the admission of bank surveillance camera footage. In Spencer, the
defendant argued that the police officer who narrated the content of body camera footage without
personal knowledge of the events therein violated the silent witness rule that the evidence
speaks for itself. Spencer, 2017 IL App (4th) 160569-U, 1 31. The court did not address the
argument, though, because the defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal. Id. ¶ 32.
Regardless, this argument is misguided because the silent witness rule does not prohibit
contemporaneous testimony. Practically speaking, it appears that the defense argued that the
narration was not helpful to the jury under Rule 701. See People v. Sykes, 972 N.E.2d 1272,
1278-79, 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (making a similar argument).
192.
See supra Part I.A.
193.
See supra Part I.B.
194.
See FED. R. EVID. 901.
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However, the blurry lines of what constitutes "demonstrative
evidence" 95 may encourage proponents of body camera footage to
stretch the knowledge prong of admissibility 96 beyond the limits of an
effective cross-examination. For example, it is unclear whether a
court would find that an expert witness who was not physically
present when the video was recorded possessed requisite "knowledge"
of the events based on a forensic analysis of the video. In such
circumstances, the defendant's sole recourse would be to establish
through cross-examination that the witness was not physically
present and therefore cannot reliably testify as to the potential for
only a partial depiction of events. The defendant will be unable to
cross-examine the witness in order to affirmatively establish any facts
about the recording's depictions.
A similar problem arises when one officer who was present at
the time of the recording but was not the recording officer testifies at
trial. Under a demonstrative evidence framework, an on-scene officer
almost certainly possesses the requisite knowledge to authenticate the
video. 197 But the defendant is unable to cross-examine the testifying
officer about the recording officer's choices to begin recording, aim the
camera in a certain direction, or end recording. Additionally, the
testifying officer likely observed the events from a different angle. If
so, the cross-examination may be less effective compared to a
cross-examination of the recording officer given that the defendant
needs to establish key facts that a third party simply cannot establish.
Body camera footage is distinguishable from evidence admitted
for "demonstrative" purposes. Whereas an expert-created chart or
simulation is prepared for use during witness testimony, one of the
main reasons police wear body cameras is to capture contemporaneous
evidence specifically for later use in criminal prosecutions.1 9 8
Demonstrative evidence, by nature, usually comes into existence after
events central to litigation have transpired because it is dependent
upon a witness's after-the-fact testimony about those events. 199
Neither contemporaneous nor after-the-fact video evidence can stand
alone in court without authentication by a sponsoring witness. 200

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
simulation
images).
200.

See Howard & Barnum, supra note 59, at 531-32.
See FED. R. EVID. 901.
See id.
See NO TAPE, No TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at 10-11.
See FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 21-23 (describing different kinds of demonstrative
evidence, including artists' sketches, computer animations, and digitally edited
See FED. R. EVID. 901.
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However, the problem with classifying body camera footage as
demonstrative evidence is the low threshold for admissibility. 201
Feigenson's concerns about the shortcomings of authentication
for "simulations of subjective experience" 202 apply to body camera
footage as well.
Feigenson argues that simulations of a party's
perception are less reliable than other demonstrative evidence when
there is no way beyond the party's own testimony to corroborate
whether the simulation is accurate. 20 3 Police body camera footage is
similar in that only the recording officer can testify to the
circumstances surrounding the recording because it depicts her
particular point of view and reflects her choice to commence and end
recording.
Lack of corroboration remains a chief concern when
admitting body camera footage and precludes proponents from
offering footage as only demonstrative evidence (absent the recording
officer's testimony).
Courts are likely to misclassify body camera footage, like "day
in the life" videos, as demonstrative evidence when the video is
actually assertive. 204 While some courts treat "day in the life" videos
as demonstrative evidence, others acknowledge their assertive intent
and admit them as substantive evidence. 205 In Grimes, plaintiffs
offered the videos as substantive evidence of their pain and suffering,
giving the court a unique opportunity to conduct a hearsay analysis of
the videos for their assertive conduct. 206
In both Grimes and
Bannister, courts admitted "day in the life" videos contingent on the
plaintiffs availability for cross-examination despite the fact that the
videos were prepared solely for use at trial and depicted the plaintiff
acting assertively.
In Grimes, the court admitted the video as
substantive rather than demonstrative evidence. 207
The court
determined the video was reliable because the defendant would have
the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff as to the video's
accuracy, tipping the scale in favor of admission under the residual
exception. 208 In Bannister, the court admitted the video as purely
demonstrative evidence under a similar rationale: that the proponent
201.
See id. 901(a) (requiring only "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims it is").
202.
EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 80, at 3:58.
203.
FEIGENSON, supra note 76, at 128.
204.
See supraPart I.B.2.
205.
See Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977)
(analyzing a video as hearsay rather than demonstrative evidence, potentially so that it may be
offered as substantive evidence).
206.
Id. at 609-611.
207.
Silbey, supra note 11, at 565-69.
208.
Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
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of the video would be available for cross-examination. 2 09 The indicia of
reliability in these cases-the defendant's ability to cross-examine the
plaintiff-do not apply to body camera footage because the state would
not necessarily involve the recording officer in the criminal
prosecution.
Unlike in civil suits, where "problems with perception,
memory, or meaning, and any sincerity problems can be solved by
having the verifying witness and the plaintiff-actor subject to
cross-examination," 210 in criminal prosecutions the imbalance of power
and resources between the state and the defendant 211 makes the
officer's availability for cross-examination less predictable. Plaintiffs
in civil litigation have a motive to testify: establishing damages. In a
criminal prosecution, defendants have no guarantee that the officer
will testify. Moreover, if there was more than one officer present at
the time of arrest, the defendant cannot be assured that all-or even
more than one officer-will testify.
Otherwise admissible demonstrative evidence must be
However, the
authenticated by a witness with knowledge. 212
authentication requirement does not effectively remedy the unique
challenges that body camera footage presents, particularly (1)
presentation of the videos within narrative context 213 and (2) affording
the defendant an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the officer
who created the video. 214
Silbey recommends treating the "demonstrative" video itself as
testimony and instructing the jury to engage in the kind of critical
analysis of the video in which an attorney would engage. 215 This Note
proposes taking Silbey's solution a step further. If the video is truly
assertive, as this Note posits that body camera footage is, then an
attorney must be able to cross-examine its creator. 2 16 A jury is ill
equipped to engage, without assistance, in a critical analysis of
so-called demonstrative evidence that is contemporaneously recorded
in body camera form. It is unable to identify problematic features of
videos without first possessing an awareness of the cognitive biases,

Bannister v. Town of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1987). "The
209.
possibility that a film will be prejudicial is significantly reduced when the subject of that film can
be cross-examined at trial." Id. at 1270.
, Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
210.
211.

See No TAPE, No TESTIMONY, supra note 7, at 11.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Kalinski, supra note 60, at 818.
See Roth, supra note 5, at 2007-08.
See Silbey, supra note 11, at 548.
Id.
Infra Part III.
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like perspective bias and framing concerns, 217 that the videos present
and
judges
themselves
routinely
overlook
in
admitting
borderline- substantive "demonstrative" evidence. 218
Body camera footage bears an even stronger assertive nature
than after-the-fact video of a crime scene because of its
contemporaneity.
After-the-fact footage is evidentiarily suspect
because of the testimonial factors-such as framing, focus, angle, and
narration, among others-that influence viewer perception. 219 The
principal danger of after-the-fact footage is that the jury takes the
video-which is more akin to an "investigative hypothesis"-as the
truth of what occurred. 220 Body camera footage is suspect for the same
reasons: contemporaneous framing, focus, angle, and narration limit
the viewers' perception of reality and funnel their vicarious
experiences solely through the lens of the recording officer. 221 The
principal danger of admitting body camera footage without
accompanying testimony is that the fact-finder believes the camera is
the complete objective truth of what occurred.

III. BODY CAMERA FOOTAGE IS HEARSAY
A hearsay framework provides the best evidentiary analysis of
body camera footage. Under this framework, the relevant components
are (1) the officer, as the declarant; (2) the camera, as her conduit; 222
(3) the officer's choice to start recording, end recording, and position
the camera lens, as the assertive intent to form a nonverbal
statement; and (4) the video, as the statement. The officer's assertive
conduct is the creation of the video, not the conduct depicted in the
video. The truth of the matter asserted is generally that (1) the
recording reflects all relevant portions of an officer's interaction with a
suspect; (2) the recording is significant in the criminal investigation;
and (3) the recording represents a true, complete version of how
events transpired according to that officer. Besides comporting to the
definitions and encompassing the structure of a nonverbal hearsay
statement, the same reliability dangers lurk in body camera footage as
in a typical hearsay statement.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Morrison, supra note 166, at 801.
Howard & Barnum, supra note 59, at 533-34.
Silbey, supra note 11, at 546.
id. at 547-48.
id.
Roth, supra note 5, at 2002.
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The FRE do not prohibit hearsay solely because of the potential
for a witness to fabricate a hearsay statement. 223 Similarly, if
fabrication were the only concern for evidence generally, body camera
footage would be among the best possible tools for ensuring reliability
because it provides at least one contemporaneously recorded account
of the interaction that could shed light on situations where
eyewitnesses disagree. Instead, more nuanced dangers accompany the
obvious danger of fabrication. 224 The primary evidentiary dangers are
"(1) faulty perception (the danger of inaccurate observation)[,] (2)
faulty memory (the danger of faulty recollection)[] (3) faulty narration
(the danger of ambiguity)[,] and (4) insincerity (the danger of
fabrication)."225
Body camera footage is particularly vulnerable to faulty
perception and faulty narration because of limitations of camera
framing, which are not necessarily the result of bad faith action or
failure to follow protocol but are inherent in the device's design. 226
Departmental policies addressing body camera use also give officers
an incredible amount of discretion in deciding when to begin recording
and when to end, opening the door to potential faulty perception. 227
Because body cameras are incapable-at least currently-of recording
every moment of every day, they do not store data unless activated. 228
As a result, the viewer has no insight into the events that transpired
before the recording activations or the events that occurred after
recording ended.
The hearsay rule is an effective tool to regulate admission of
body camera footage because it evaluates evidence based on
underlying indicia of reliability present in the evidence. There is no
need to adapt or alter the rules of evidence to specifically address body
camera footage. In Part III.B, this Note analyzes Maryland's adoption
of Rule 5-803(b)(8)(C) as a case study showing that attempts to make
rules around body cameras are muddled and imprecise. 229 The
hearsay rule allows the chief inquiry to rest on the declarant's
manifested intent 230 and not on the nature of the evidence itself,
FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules (citing
223.
Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 177, 214, 217 (1948)) (listing "perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents)"
among other hearsay dangers).

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id.
Nicolas, supra note 118, at 537.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part IIA.
See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
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rendering the rule malleable and able to assess numerous forms of
evidence-tangible, verbal, or virtual. As such, legislating around
body camera footage is irrational and impractical when the evidence
fits within the well-tested, existing hearsay framework.
A. Choosing to Record Is Assertive: Indicia of Intent to Communicate
Present in Body Camera Operators
As noted in Part I.C, a "hearsay statement" must be the
product of an intentional assertion. 231 The two cornerstones of
nonverbal assertions are present in body camera footage: the presence
of an audience, combined with a person's affirmative choice to act with
intent to communicate. 232 These two factors blend together because
the presence of an audience is a reliable indicator that a person
intends to communicate to the person in her presence. This Section
analogizes body camera footage to existing forms of nonverbal
hearsay. Courts have found three factors particularly salient when
assessing whether a declarant intended to assert a statement:
whether the party who created the evidence has a stake in the
litigation, whether the video was created for litigation, and whether
the person acted for an audience. 233 These factors are all indicia that
an actor meant to convey something with her action. 234
A party's stake in litigation and the purpose for which the
video was created are significant indicators of a declarant's
communicative intent. 235 In Grimes, the defendant challenged the

231.
See id. 801; supra Part I.C.
232.
See supra Part I.C. This Note does not distinguish between Kirgis's objective intent
and subjective intent to communicate because an officer's choice to record theoretically satisfies
both. See Kirgis, supra note 108, at 291-95. An objective onlooker would realize the officer's
intent to communicate because collecting evidence is a function of police work. Subjectively,
officers are not recording for posterity, but for the sole goal of recording the events for their
supervisor, a prosecutor, or a jury to review.

233.
See, e.g., United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983); Grimes v.
Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977). Action for an audience may, at
times, have two components. First, the audience may have asked a question to which the
declarant responded with nonverbal action. See Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d at 775 (nodding in
response to a question is an assertion); Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky.
1986) (a child pointing to a social worker's doll is assertive), overruled on other grounds by B.B. v.
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007). Second, the presence of an audience, alone, may
indicate that a declarant intended for the conduct to be assertive.
234.
When evaluating "day in the life" videos, courts also consider the same factors in
analyzing whether the videos violate Rule 403. See Kalinski, supranote 60, at 810-11.
235.
This trend runs throughout the FRE. Rule 702 disfavors methods developed solely
for litigation. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendments. Rule
901(b)(2) disfavors nonexpert opinions about handwriting when the witness's familiarity with
the handwriting was acquired for the litigation at issue. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2). Similarly,
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content of the plaintiffs "day in the life" video because it portrayed the
The court did not simply
plaintiff engaged in assertive action.
examine the content of the video to determine whether the video was
assertive. 236 Instead, the court found it important that the plaintiff
had offered the video in order to prove pain and suffering. 237 Because
the plaintiff had a stake in the litigation, it was more likely that the
238
plaintiff acted intending to assert his daily struggles to the jury.
Similarly, the court found the contents of the video were more likely to
be assertive because the video was prepared in anticipation of
litigation. 239
Like plaintiffs in a civil action, police have a stake in the
adversarial process because of their close working relationship 240 with
prosecutors. Some may argue that police are more insulated from
motives that eventual prosecution creates because the prosecutor's
failure is not necessarily the officer's failure. 241 But officers have an
undeniable stake in litigation. Police and prosecutors work together
to enforce laws, gather evidence, and present that evidence in court.
They are united in their symbiotic relationship, 242 where officers
provide evidence and prosecutors seek convictions based on that

whether evidence meets the Confrontation Clause's "testimonial" requirement partly hinges on
whether a piece of evidence was prepared with the defendant's prosecution in mind. See infra
text accompanying note 261; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321-22
(2009).
See Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
236.
Id. ("[A] film offered by the plaintiff showing the plaintiff performing tasks to exhibit
237.
his disability is like a witness testifying about assertive conduct.").
238.
See id.
239.
See id.
See Letitia James, Prosecutors and Police: The Inherent Conflict in Our Courts,
240.
MSNBC (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:46 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/prosecutors-police-inherentconflict-our-courts [https://perma.cc/2DVT-9TY3] (highlighting that this working relationship
complicates prosecution of police brutality cases).
Dallin Oaks raised a similar argument regarding the ineffectiveness of the
241.
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police conduct. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 726-32 (1970). Because of the
supposed disconnect between police and prosecutors, the rule requiring exclusion of the
prosecutor's evidence may not deter police from conducting illegal searches and seizures. Id.
However, other studies show that the exclusionary rule may incentivize police to work even more

closely with prosecutors to ensure that warrants are constitutionally sufficient. Craig D. Uchida
& Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases": The Effects of the
Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1065-66 (1991).
John Buchanan, Police-ProsecutorTeams: Innovations in Several Jurisdictions, NIJ
242.
REP., May-June 1989, at 1, 2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/120288NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7YE-XVVY] (explaining a "cross pollination" of methods from police and
prosecutors' offices, in which both organizations operate with both the investigation and the trial
in mind rather than bifurcating the police's investigation and the prosecutor's trial).
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evidence. 2 4 3 The fact that officers are often repeat witnesses in
prosecutors' courtrooms is an indicator that police body camera
footage is assertive. 244 It gives officers a motive to support the
prosecutor's case: to keep the working relationship positive and
mutually beneficial.
Because police officers are called as state
witnesses in prosecutions, or their evidence is presented in the state's
case in chief, they have a stake in the outcome of the prosecution. 245
Just as a plaintiffs conduct is more likely to be assertive when she
offers it in a video she created, 246 an officer's conduct is more likely
assertive when she knows her job is to capture evidence of wrongdoing
on her camera. Whereas a plaintiffs assertion is that "I endured
serious pain and suffering," the officer's assertion is that "this is a true
depiction of what I encountered, and it is evidence of wrongdoing."
Courts have repeatedly found that a declarant's nonverbal
conduct is assertive when she acts in the presence of an audience-for
example, nodding in response to a question, pointing to a suspect in a
lineup, and pointing to a body part on a doll were all deemed
inadmissible hearsay unless they fell under an exception to the rule. 2 4 7
Police know they are recording encounters with suspects for an
audience: first the prosecutor, then a judge, and eventually a jury.
That police officers choose to record at certain times with knowledge of
a future audience is a strong indicator of communicative intent. 248
The officer's conduct is also similar to a person nodding in response to
a question. 249 Departments mandate in their body camera guidelines
that officers record certain interactions. 2 5 0 When officers do activate
their camera in response to these guidelines, they are answering the
department's constant, lingering question: "Have any of these
significant events occurred during your patrol?" When the officer
presses the "activate" button, she is answering, "Yes, and here is a
recording of it."

243.
JOAN E. JACOBY, PETER S. GILCHRIST, III & EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, JEFFERSON INST.
FOR JUSTICE STUDIES, PROMOTING INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION: PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE TO

POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONS 8 (1999), http://www.jijs.org/publications/prospubs/policepros.pdf [https://perma.cc/L92K-BDCE].
244.
See Jon Swaine et al., Ties That Bind, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015, 8:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/ties-that-bind-conflicts-of-interest-policekillings [https://perma.cc/95C4-NJAY].
245.
See id.
246.
See Grimes v. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Alaska 1977).
247.
See supra Part I.C.
248.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a); supra Part I.C.
249.
See United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983).
250.
See supra Part II.A.
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B. Interpretinga Rule Aimed at Body Cameras
In April 2017, Maryland adopted a new rule of evidence to
This Section
address evidentiary challenges to body cameras.
to legislate
of
trying
difficulty
the
illustrate
examines that rule to
around hearsay evidence that already conforms to established
evidentiary frameworks.
Like the FRE, 25 1 Maryland's Rule 5-803(b)(8) makes public
records admissible, 252 and Rule 5-803(b)(8)(C) creates an exception to
that exception, deeming "record[s] of matters observed by a law
enforcement person" inadmissible. 2 53 Amended Rule 5-803(b)(8)(D)
reads as follows:
(D) Subject to Rule 5-805, an electronic recording of a
camera worn by a law enforcement person or by another
employed by a law enforcement agency may be admitted
accused if (i) it is properly authenticated, (ii) it was made

the matter recorded,
2 54
trustworthiness.

and (iii) circumstances

matter made by a body
type of recording device
when offered against an
contemporaneously with

do not indicate

a

lack of

Maryland based its exception on the contemporaneous nature
of body camera footage. 255 During consideration of the proposed
amendment, Judge Frederic Smalkin briefed the Court of Appeals
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the
Judge
"Standing Committee") on the proposed amendment. 256
Smalkin communicated that because body camera footage is recorded
contemporaneously with the events it depicts, it is more reliable than
after-the-fact police reports. 2 57 The Standing Committee agreed,
emphasizing the technological advances (like automatic cloud storage)
that distinguish body camera footage from the hearsay dangerS 258 that
lurk in police reports. 259 But police reports were not excluded solely

251.
252.
253.
254.

See FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
MD. CODE ANN., Maryland Rules
Id. § 5-803(b)(8)(C).
Id. § 5-803(b)(8)(D).

§ 5-803(b)(8)

(West 2012).

COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
255.
MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE RULES COMMITTEE 17-19 (2016) [hereinafter MINUTES OF

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutesCOMMITTEE],
RULES
MARYLAND
rules/20160108.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NA2-77FL].
Id. at 17-18, 28. Judge Frederic Smalkin is a former judge on the US District Court
256.
for the District of Maryland and current professor of law at the University of Baltimore. Id. at
16-17; Fredric C. Smalkin, U. BALT. http://law.ubalt.edu/faculty/profiles/smalkin.cfm
[https://perma.cc/R7BE-6FED] (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
Id. at 16-18.
257.
Roth, supra note 5, at 1985 (listing "insincerity, inarticulateness, erroneous memory,
258.
and faulty perception" as the dangers of hearsay).
MINUTES OF MARYLAND RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 255, at 18-19, 28.
259.
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for reliability concerns as with private business documents prepared
by
nonstate
actors-FRE
803(8)(A)(ii)
and
Maryland
Rule
5-803(b)(8)(C) render police reports inadmissible because their
admission into evidence would violate the Confrontation Clause: 260
Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at
trial despite their hearsay status. But that is not the case if the regularly
conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial. . . . The
analysts' certificates-like police reports generated by law enforcement
officials-do not qualify as business or public records for precisely the same
26 1
reason.

Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(8)(C) is notable first and foremost
because the text and structure of the Rule acknowledge that body
camera footage itself is hearsay. Two factors make this clear. First,
the Standing Committee acknowledged that the video itself
constitutes a "record of matters observed by a law enforcement
person" under a broad, textual reading of the existing hearsay
prohibition. 262 Second, the Standing Committee proposed the adopted
Rule as an exception to hearsay rather than amending the definition
of hearsay to exclude body camera footage. 263 The latter action would
have been a clear statement by the Standing Committee that body
camera footage is not hearsay. Instead, it opted to create an exception
under Maryland Rule 5-803 titled "Hearsay Exceptions: Unavailability
of the Declarant Not Required." 264
A predicate to creating an
exception to the hearsay rule is that the exception would have
otherwise been hearsay.
However, the Standing Committee itself would likely resist the
classification of body camera footage as hearsay. 265 In its discussion of
the proposed Rule on January 8, 2016, the Standing Committee
recorded in its minutes that "[t]heoretically, the visual footage should
have been able to come in anyhow. The chair noted that it is not

260.
See Paul W. Grimm, Jerome E. Deise & John R. Grimm, The Confrontation Clause
and the Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155, 184
(2010) ("By definition, fact findings resulting from investigations authorized by law are created
in anticipation of use in litigation, not for the internal administration of the affairs of the
creating agency.").
261.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321-22 (2009) (citations omitted); see
also id. at 316 ("Though the witness's statements in Davis were 'near-contemporaneous' to the
events she reported, we nevertheless held that they could not be admitted absent an opportunity
to confront the witness.").
262.

MINUTES OF MARYLAND RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 255, at 17.

263.
264.

See MD. CODE ANN., Maryland Rules
See id.

265.

MINUTES OF MARYLAND RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 255, at 22.

§ 5-803(b)(8)(D)

(West 2012).
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The audio portion is hearsay." 266 Yet the Standing
hearsay.
Committee adopted the amended language that exempted "an
electronic recording of a matter made by a body camera worn by a law
enforcement person" from the prohibition against hearsay. 267 Notably,
the Rule's text exempts the "recording," not the "audio portion" of the
recording.
Maryland's analysis of whether body camera footage should
constitute hearsay shows that the footage is closely related to hearsay
jurisprudence surrounding public records. Dru Letourneau argued
that although body camera footage may be hearsay, courts may find
that it falls within FRE 803(8)'s public record exception to hearsay. 268
FRE 803(8)(A)(ii)'s
to address
fails
Letourneau
However,
a matter observed
case,
a
criminal
"in
inadmissible
caveat-rendering
269 In short, the Standing Committee
by law-enforcement personnel."
was right-body camera footage is textually a "matter observed by law
enforcement personnel" 270 and is thus inadmissible if a court agrees
that the video is a statement. But the Committee was shortsighted
both in failing to consider that the video portion itself may be hearsay
and in relying on contemporaneity as grounds for admitting the body
camera footage. The key to properly admitting body camera footage is
consistency: Courts must treat the body camera footage as any other
type of hearsay and render it inadmissible but for an exception.
IV. A PATH TO ADMISSIBILITY

To remedy the hearsay dangers that body camera footage
presents, courts must consider the footage hearsay when offered for
the truth of the matter asserted. 271 As with all hearsay, parties are
not precluded from admitting the footage as evidence, nor does the
classification pose an insurmountable burden to prosecutors
presenting their cases. Rather, there are two clear routes for
admissibility-both of which hinge on the recording officer's
testimony. The first is for the recording officer to testify, admitting

Id. (discussing whether the proposed amendment would make recordings from crime
266.
scene technicians' body cameras admissible if they had no sound and only depicted visual
footage).
See Maryland Rules § 5-803(b)(8)(C).
267.
Letourneau, supra note 18, at 460.
268.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
269.
See Maryland Rules § 5-803(b)(8)(C).
270.
271.
See FED. R. EVID. 801.
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the officer's prior statement as a present sense impression. 272 The
second route is for the recording officer to testify, both authenticating
the evidence and offering the footage not for the truth of the matter
asserted but as evidence corroborating the officer's oral testimony.
The officer would first testify verbally to what happened the day of the
officer-suspect interaction. Then, the prosecutor may admit the body
camera video to establish consistency with the officer's version of
events.
The Sections below explains how each admission would
function, and the benefits of each.
A. Body Camera Footage as a Present Sense Impression
Under Rule 803(1), the proponent offering body camera footage
into evidence has a strong case that the footage is a present sense
impression, defined as "[a] statement describing or explaining an
event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant
perceived it."273 Body camera footage's contemporaneity makes it
perhaps the most literal present sense impression that the Rule could
have contemplated. The footage "describes" an event made while the
declarant, the officer, perceived it.274
If body camera footage were a present sense impression and
therefore admissible hearsay (if offered for the truth of the matter
asserted), the footage would still likely be inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause unless the recording officer testified. 275 Under
the Confrontation Clause, testimonial statementS 276 are inadmissible
unless the criminal defendant is able to cross-examine the
declarant. 277 The inquiry then becomes whether body camera footage
is testimonial.
If the footage is testimonial, the prosecutor is
constitutionally required to produce the recording officer for the
defendant to cross-examine for the footage to be admissible. 278
When the evidence at issue is the product of a witness
statement to a police officer, whether evidence is testimonial depends
upon the "primary purpose" of the interrogation. 2 79 In the case of body

272.
See United States v. Morfin-Martinez, 2 F. App'x 650, 652 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding a
statement admissible when offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but for establishing
consistency between a witness's in-court testimony and a tape-recorded hearsay statement).
273.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
274.
See id.
275.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
276.
See Pamela R. Metzger, Confrontation as a Rule of Production, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 995, 998 n.18 (2016).
277.
See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 354 (2011).
278.
See id.
279.
Id. at 358-59.
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camera footage, there is no interrogation; the police officer is the
declarant. The more pertinent inquiry is whether the statement-in
this case, the footage-is testimonial by virtue of its preparation for
use in litigation. 280
Body camera footage is certainly prepared in anticipation of
litigation, as it is touted as an evidence-gathering tool for police and
prosecutors. 281 The officer's discretionary action to begin recording in
response to enumerated triggering events is communicative, similar to
282
Because of its
an officer creating a written record in a police report.
testimonial nature, body camera footage is subject to the
Confrontation Clause. Therefore, it is only admissible if the officer
testifies.
This solution is beneficial because the Confrontation Clause
requirement forces the recording officer to the stand, since she is the
declarant of the testimonial statement. Therefore, the defendant is
able to more effectively cross-examine the officer.
B. Body Camera Footage as CorroborativeEvidence
The second approach to admitting body camera footage under a
hearsay framework is to admit it to corroborate the recording officer's
account of the situation, not for the truth of the matter asserted.
Whether evidence is hearsay, by definition, depends upon the purpose
for which the evidence is offered. 283 Only evidence offered for the
284
Evidence
truth of the matter asserted is inadmissible hearsay.
offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted is
admissible under Rule 801 as long as it is admissible under the rest of
the FRE. 2 8 5 For example, a statement may be admissible to establish
that a party was on notice that a statement was said, even if the
statement isn't true. 2 86 Similarly, impeachments by prior inconsistent
out-of-court statements are admissible because they are not offered for

See supra text accompanying note 261; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
280.
U.S. 305, 321-22 (2009).
See supra Part II.A.
281.
See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321-22.
282.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note to 1972
283.
proposed rules ("If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was
made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.").
FED. R. EVID. 801(c); id. 802.
284.
Id.
285.
George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1990) ("To be sure, an out of court
286.
statement offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to show that the defendant
was on notice of a danger, is not hearsay.").
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the truth of the matter asserted. 287 Prior inconsistent statements are
offered instead to attack the witness's credibility: Because the witness
said two different things at two different times, one of those times
they must have been untruthful. 28 8 Therefore, the witness is not
credible.
Corroborative evidence of a prior consistent statement, which
bolsters credibility, is functionally the opposite of a prior inconsistent
statement, which impeaches credibility, but it is admissible under the
same framework.
Like a prior inconsistent statement, a prior
consistent statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Therefore, it is not hearsay. Instead, corroborative evidence
is offered to show consistency in a witness's statements: that a witness
made the same statement numerous times.
This consistency
translates to witness credibility. Because a declarant said the same
thing more than once, but on different occasions, it is more likely to be
true.289

Admitting body camera footage as corroborative evidence
benefits both sides in litigation. When a court admits the body camera
footage as corroborative evidence, the prosecution is able to bolster the
officer's in-court testimony (assuming that it aligns with the footage)
as credible and worthy of belief.29 0 The defendant is likewise
better-off, free to effectively challenge the narrative the footage
presents to the jury via cross-examination. The footage offered for a
purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted is notable because
it (theoretically) limits the purposes for which the jury may consider
the video. Footage offered as corroborative rather than substantive
evidence mitigates the concerns about a jury taking the footage as
objective truth more so than does admitting the footage as substantive
287.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
288.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 8 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1993); see FED. R.
EVID. 801(c)(2). Prior inconsistent statements offered solely for impeachment purposes are
similar, but not identical, to prior inconsistent statements given "under penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition." See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (rendering
the latter admissible as substantive evidence).
289.
See United States v. Morfin-Martinez, 2 F. App'x 650, 651-52 (8th Cir. 2001); State
v. Caplan, 353 A.2d 172, 176 (Me. 1976).
290.
Additionally, the prosecutor is able to admit the footage as substantive evidence if
the defense challenges the officer's in-court testimony by alleging "that the declarant recently
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying." See FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i). The FRE adopted the requirements in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,
158 (1995) for prior inconsistent statements: "[A] consistent statement offered to rebut a charge
of recent fabrication of improper influence or motive must have been made before the alleged
fabrication or improper inference or motive arose." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) advisory
committee's note to 2014 proposed amendment. Body camera footage satisfies Tome's rule: an
officer records it before testifying in court about the events she perceived, and the courtroom is
where the defense would allege fabrication occurred. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158.
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evidence under the present sense impression exception. This is
especially true if a judge issues a limiting instruction, instructing the
jury not to consider the video for the truth of the matter within. 29 1
V. CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORKS

The routes to admissibility described above are intended to
ensure that the body camera evidence the jury sees is as reliable as
possible. Both accomplish this goal by ensuring the defendant's access
to two resources the current evidentiary standards do not yet
guarantee: (1) admission of footage predicated on availability of crossexamination and (2) availability of the officer who recorded the
footage.
Under each framework, a defense attorney may address
evidentiary flaws in the footage through cross-examination. With the
recording officer on the stand, the defense can question the officer's
record of conduct, question events preceding and following the
recording, and raise doubt about events potentially occurring off
Silbey similarly advocates for
camera or beyond its range. 2 92
''cross-examining film" as an effective way to prevent the "constructed
medium" of film (in her case study, a dash camera video of a police
encounter) from masquerading as objective truth. 29 3 Silbey's proposal
assumes that a witness will be on the stand to cross-examine. 294
When courts treat body camera footage as a hearsay statement,
criminal defendants can use Silbey's techniqueS 295 to cross-examine
the declarant, the recording officer. Cross-examination of an officer
who records body camera footage is particularly salient for the reasons
listed in Part II. Body camera footage is riddled with potential
cognitive biases that the jury is ill-equipped to address alone (more so
than other types of video evidence). 296 The defendant's attorney can
help the jury to understand those biases and the limitations of video
footage during cross-examination. 2 9 7
When the footage is offered as corroborative evidence, a defense
attorney has added tools with which to mitigate concerns present in
body camera footage. She may request a limiting instruction from the
judge explaining why the video is admissible only to corroborate in291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
[flilm" and
296.
297.

See FED. R. EVID. 105.
See Silbey, supranote 6, at 41-42.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 41-45 (including "[1]ock[ing] in [t]estimony and [c]ontrast[ing it with the]
"[e]xploit[ing] [f]ilmic [fjragments.").
See Morrison, supranote 166, at 801.
See id.

1300

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:4:1259

court testimony and should not be taken as an account of what
occurred. 298 In extreme cases, the attorney may object under Rule 403
for complete exclusion of the video when the danger of unfair prejudice
(the jury taking the video for the truth of what it depicts)
substantially outweighs its probative value (corroborating the officer's
testimony). 299 This will likely only be successful when the prosecutor
uses the officer's testimony as pretext to show the jury especially
harmful footage, if it is ever successful at all. 300
However, cross-examination alone is insufficient if the witness
is not the recording officer.
As noted in Part I, Rule 901
authentication requirements for videos typically consist of a witness
with knowledge testifying that the contents of the video are what the
witness says they are. 30 1 Or, in the case that no person was present
for the events depicted in the video, the silent witness theory allows a
witness to testify to the camera's reliability. 302 However, in criminal
prosecutions, prosecutors must only present enough evidence to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-not all of the
evidence. 303 Therefore, a prosecutor may not call all the police officers
present at a scene to testify,3 04 nor should they. Some officers patrol
in pairs, 305 and many more may be present in an arrest where an
officer calls for backup. 306 A host of factors may influence a
prosecutor's decision to call one police officer over another to testify,
including credibility, past performance (good or bad) at trial, or a
perceived danger of the officer being impeached.
Officers may also observe different portions of an event from
different vantages.
This is why the current authentication
requirements, standing alone, fail to ensure that body camera footage

298.
See FED. R. EVID. 105.
299.
See id. 403.
300.
See id. (requiring that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh the
evidence's probative value).
301.
See supra Part I.A.
302.
See supra Part I.A.
303.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
304.

See, e.g., Anatomy of a Criminal Case, OFF. DISTRICT AT''Y, COUNTY SANTA CLARA

(Dec. 19, 2012, 5:14 PVI), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/prosecution/anatomyofcriminalcase/
Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ZRH-Q78X] ("The prosecutor calls all the witnesses
necessary to prove the crime." (emphasis added)).
305.
Christina Sterbenz, Police Around the Country Are Making a Complicated Call to
Increase Officer Safety in the Wake of Dallas and Baton Rouge, BUS. INSIDER
(July 19, 2016, 7:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/problems-of-police-working-in-pairs2016-7 [https://perma.cc/K28G-Y3LA].
306.
See Donald R. Weaver, Calling for Backup: Changing Law Enforcement Culture so
Officers Are Not Afraid to Ask for Help, LEXIPOL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.lexipol.com/news/
calling-for-backup-changing-law-enforcement-culture/ [https://perma.cc/C854-53F4].
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is reliable evidence. 307 The defendant's cross-examination is limited to
challenging what that officer perceived rather than the recording
officer herself. A defendant's cross-examination is far less effective
when the nonrecording officer's answer to a question is "I don't know"
or "I couldn't see" rather than more definitive, factual answers the
recording officer can provide. Instead, when the recording officer
testifies to the version of events she perceived and then shows the jury
her body camera video corroborating her testimony, the defense may
effectively cross-examine her based on consistencies, or perceived
inconsistencies.
When a prosecutor admits a video as a present sense
impression, the recording officer must testify to satisfy the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights.30 8 Offering the body camera footage to
corroborate the testifying officer's oral account of an event is similarly
beneficial because it forces the recording officer to the stand.
Corroborative evidence must be consistent with the declarant's
testimony. 309 A nonrecording officer would not be the "declarant" of
the video and would therefore not be able to corroborate her own
3 10
This
current testimony with another officer's prior statement.
most
the
conduct
to
ensures that the defendant has the ability
effective cross-examination of the officer.
Critics may be rightfully wary of treating an officer's statement
as hearsay in the event that a defendant seeks to introduce it at trial.
If the defendant seeks to introduce the evidence to impeach the
311 In the
officer's version of events, she may do so as an impeachment.
Baltimore police example above, the defendant (had the state not
dropped the charges) could still have introduced the body camera
footage for impeachment purposes had the officer testified that the
video depicted the officer finding the drugs for the first time. In a civil
action against a police officer, a plaintiff may admit the video under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A) as a statement by a party opponent as long as a
witness to the scene of recording (including the plaintiff) can
authenticate it.312 In a criminal use of force case where the officer is a
defendant, the footage is admissible through the same avenue with
the same authentication caveat. 3 13

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part W.A.
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157-58 (1995).
See FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
See id. 613(b).
See id. 801(d)(2)(A), 901.
See id. 801(d)(2)(A), 901.
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Although these frameworks do not remedy every concern body
camera footage presents, they mitigate reliability concerns by not
presenting body camera footage as the be-all and end-all of the
police-citizen encounter. Police witnesses have more information than
the body cameras because they were present for the uninterrupted
entirety of the police encounter. As a result, their testimony is
valuable to defendants who seek to cross-examine them.
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